

**Regionalism and Policy Making: Perspectives
from International Relations**

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ABSTRACT

The work of international relations scholars offers a number of perspectives on political developments within East Asia, in particular processes of regionalization, ideas of regionalism and the nature of regions: it can uncover the role of formal organisations, the role of trade linkages and the role of ideas and perceptions, plus, comparatively, it can spell out lessons from other parts of the world and other periods in history-in particular Europe. Public policy making within the states of East Asia must be responsive to both domestic and international demands: the former, the complex play of domestic politics-cultural traditions, political systems, organisations and social groups plus the ever shifting debates within the public sphere (personal, print and digital); the later, the subtle exchanges between sovereign powers-primarily ordered by elites - organised around a core trio of concerns common to all elites (state-making, nation-building and development) as they read and react to enfolding global structural circumstances (production, finance, security and knowledge). Analysis points to a number of lessons for policy makers in sovereign states in East Asia in respect of the issue of regions-two are perhaps crucial-first, the value of an over-arching goal coupled to day-to-day pragmatism and consensus building in respect of trade-second, the importance of paying attention to security and the lessons and legacies of history.

Making Sense of International Politics

The study of international politics is not new. Any elite undertaking exchanges with other elites would have had some ideas about the politics but in the twentieth century these exchanges became the focus of a distinct intellectual discipline, that is, international relations scholarship.

The main scholarly approaches to international politics

The scholarly discipline of international relations takes shape in the wake of the Great War in Europe and it calls attention to the broad realm of international politics. At this time President Wilson works to construct the League of Nations and the body enshrines a broad scale political model: people belong to nations, nations should have their own states and relations between states should be ordered by the League of Nations. Individual and collective welfare be protected. However as the 1930s unfolded there were conflicts in Europe and in various overseas empire territories and the optimism of Wilsonian idealism faded. At this point the first major international relations theory took shape-realism (Carr, 1892-1982). It argued that the fundamental relationship between sovereign states was one of power (industrial/military power). The Second World War and the cold war were read by international relations scholars as confirmation of their theoretical ideas and realism became the dominant tradition amongst international relations scholars-it still is-but it has been joined by further theoretical approaches.

A second related approach calls attention to inter-linkages between sovereign states. Available as an abstract ideal since the Enlightenment, it emerged with a utilitarian focus in the years following the Second World War. One aspect of the post-war period has been the growth of international trade and the related rise in levels of living for many people around the globe-hence the perspectives of liberalism and interdependence. This approach to the international politics of relations between states calls attention to the mutual benefits that participants win by cooperation-the key instance of such cooperative relations is international trade-liberal and interdependence theorists argue that these links between sovereign states work to bind the states together and industrial/military power is both supplemented and constrained by the development of deep trading relationships. The approach has been influential but realism is probably still the mainstream position.

In recent years a third further line of argument has appeared-it calls attention to the role of ideas-to the ways in which elites in one sovereign state conceptualize their own place in the world and that of other states (which also have their own sets of perceptions). This work is also shaped by its context. The end of the cold war and the collapse of related ideologies (bloc-think), the rise of East Asian economies (and talk of culture) and the passing enthusiasm for globalization (part affirmation of liberal ideology and part acknowledgement of other residual-cultures) encouraged international relations scholars to turn their attention to social learning and the role of ideas-hence social constructivism. In the context of political relations between sovereign states the approach suggested that elite action would be shaped by perceptions-that the sets of ideas carried in culture would inevitably inform elite thinking and action.

Finally, fourth, in addition to these three a further approach should be noted: international political economy. It takes elements from all these and centres its analyses of international politics on the ways in which agents have to read and react to enfolding structural circumstances in order to sustain the livelihoods of their populations-one influential (Strange, 1988) formulation argues that states have to read and react to changes in production, finance, security and knowledge structures. Or, put simply, elites have to manage the domestic and international demands placed upon them in order to plot a route to the future for the polity, which they lead.

So, there are two main approaches to international politics plus two relatively new approaches: first, realism, with a focus on industrial/military power; second, liberalism, which grants the role of power but focuses on the importance of inter-linkages; third, constructivism, which grants the role of power and inter-linkages but focuses on agent perceptions; and fourth, international political economy, which grants all the above but focuses on the ways in which groups manage the demands of change.

Description versus interpretation in social science

Social constructivism is different from mainstream realism and liberalism in that it turns away from the scholarly task of describing/explaining the external world and instead invites reflection upon the sets of ideas/cultures that inform the thinking and actions of policy elites in

sovereign states. So the basis is in interpretative-critical philosophy and its focus is on the ways in which actors make sense of their situations (Preston, 2009).

Interpretive-critical philosophy lies at the heart of the European tradition of social sciences. The interpretive work revolves around claims about human language, and here hermeneutics, linguistics and ordinary language philosophy all place language at the centre of both human social life and also scholarly reflection upon human social life. The critical work revolves around claims about idea of progress: it is taken to be exemplified by the achievements of the natural sciences; it is taken to be available to the social sciences; and it is taken to require a particular intellectual procedure, that is, ideas are placed in context, their elements unpacked and their contemporary utility determined. The process is reiterative, never complete. The strategy was used by Marx, by later sociologists of knowledge and cultural critics. Interpretive-critical analysis enables scholars to detail the process of the social construction of claims to knowledge, including those made by players involved in international relations. The focus of these approaches is on the language carried sets of ideas that inform social life; either in fundamental fashion, that is, ideas as constitutive of social practices or in directed fashion, that is, ideas informing more or less self conscious lines of social practice (rules of chess versus any particular chess game). Unpacked in more practical terms, this sort of work calls attention to cultures, ideologies, discourses and so on. The approach does not aim to offer causal explanations, rather it seeks to elucidate the sets of ideas in agents heads the better to understand why they act the way they do (thus, grasping the actions of the new government in Pyongyang-doctrines of self-reliance, the military first plus desire for diplomatic acknowledgement from the USA-all unpacked as provocations).

In international relations scholarship an interpretive-critical approach has been popularized by Alexander Wendt (1992; 1999; 2000)-a sociologist-who argues that the realm of international political relations is constituted by the interaction of elite groups mostly located within the bureaucratic machineries of states. These interactions are shaped by the ideas/cultures which players inhabit, and these comprise traditions, hence international political relations depend upon the ways in which players draw upon tradition and these ideas shape their views of each other, thus ideas/culture inform action. The approach has divided opinion amongst international

relations scholars: those preferring descriptive work have either dismissed it altogether or relegated it to the status of subjective reflection (which might occasionally produce interesting ideas that can then be dealt with properly, that is, descriptively); whilst those familiar with interpretive-critical work in philosophy have welcomed the approach, arguing that it is both intellectually sophisticated (in contrast to the descriptive preferences of the mainstream) and a source of new insights into practical policy making.

One further point can be made: the idea of ‘social construction’ need not be restricted to commentary on the ‘role of ideas’ for it can encompass the ways in which agents make sense of their situation in practical ways. In brief, there is a richer way of using the idea of social construction. This can be seen in some strands of international political economy and this way of thinking about international politics places agents at the centre of analysis and asks how they read and react to enfolding structural circumstances (where ‘structure’ here means the sum total of what every other social actor else does). Thus elite agents, crucially located in the machinery of the state, must read and react to enfolding circumstances in order to plot a route to the future-domestic and international-for the polities that they lead.

All that said, for the moment the resources of international relations scholarship offer a rich stock of ideas-ordered in four distinct perspectives-with which to analyse the international politics in East Asia and the matter of the slow, partial creation of a coherent region.

The Idea of Regions

The idea of region is familiar; indeed, it tends to be taken for granted. It is read often as a simple geographical term, this, in turn, alludes to climate, perhaps to ethnicity. But this is a mistake. Regions are not simple givens, rather they are elaborate social constructions, they are ways of interpreting the character of a designated area, their identification lodges claims to distinctiveness, and many agents have a hand in their creation.

The social construction of regions

Regions are not simply given by geography. The idea of a region is a way of grasping sets of relationships between agents. Regions are social constructions. The ways in which agents can make sense of a set of geographically bounded relationships, speaking, for example, of an 'economic region' or a 'political region' or a 'cultural region' (Bernard, 1996; Zysman, 1996). In the context of international politics the relevant agents are to be found amongst the political elites, in the administrative machineries of the state and within the public sphere and debates between these players will produce ideas of regions. Such ideas will thereafter be pursued in conversations with other groups of players, and in the context of international politics, those from other states.

The social construction of a region is a complex process. In order to grasp these processes three ideas can be distinguished: first, regionalization, which points to the creation of low level linkages between players within the region; second, regionalism, which points to the self-conscious elite identification of a region and consequent adoption of policy stances; and third, region, the result of the process of construction, always provisional and always open to revision.

East Asia: Power, linkages, ideas and the role of agents in making regions

International relations theory offers distinct traditions with which scholarship can approach the issue of regions—each has a particular focus—realism on power, liberalism on inter-linkages, social constructivism on perceptions and international political economy on the dynamic of agents and structures. It may be noted that theories of regionalism have often been linked to the experience of the European Union—ideas of federalism, functionalism, inter-governmentalism and governance—but for East Asia the historical trajectory points to the informal nature of regionalism—so caution must be exercised in any arguments about Asia that reference the European Union (Soderbaum, 2012).

(a) East Asia-power

Schematically, a sequence of historical political forms could be posited: pre-contact dynastic polities, colonial regimes and then sovereign states. Plus, today, at a larger scale, regions as a feature of state-to-state relationships: this produces complex manoeuvring as states seek to balance economic and security interests in the short term with ideas about how the longer term might develop; this also produces much commentary in the form of attempts to interpret the concerns of players and sketch out possible scenarios. Where state-to-state conversations are successful all this produces formal organisations such as ASEAN, ASEAN plus 3, APEC, ASEM, TPP, EAS (Rozman, 2012). These are inevitably differently constituted (Frost, 2009; Ba, 2009; Acharya, 2010) and they are always provisional; subject to reform, adjustment and neglect depending on the ever shifting concerns of the involved players. In respect of the core concerns of realists-industrial/military power-the key organisational expression of power relations is to be found in the links that the USA has with its various allies in the region, pre-eminently Japan, thereafter South Korea and Taiwan with other countries in Southeast Asia and Australasia also variously linked (Johnson, 2000). At the same time, it might be noted, that there is no East or Southeast Asian equivalent of NATO-East Asia has taken a quite different route in respect of security to that adopted in the North Atlantic area.

(b) East Asia-inter-linkages

Regions could be thought of as patterns of inter-linkages and whilst such linkages can be formed from various human actions, lately the key has been trade. As above, a sequence of political forms can be recalled, where each had a typical form of economic life: first, pre-contact civilizations oriented towards local trading networks and dynastic China; followed second by subordinated peripheral areas within state-empire systems oriented towards extra-regional core economies; followed by today's economies regulated by sovereign states in turn lodged within global networks. In the recent period inter-linkages can be manifold: informal networks (migrants or informal sector finance or criminal fraternities); corporate networks (regional production and distribution networks); plus state-sponsored links (regional free trade agreements, regional development bodies such as Asian Development Bank or Mekong River Commission or SIJORI

or specialist regional agreements such as Chiang Mai Agreement)-all these feed into the creation of economic inter-linkages. Thus in respect of the core concerns of liberals/interdependence theory-acknowledging inter-linkages-there are many instances of such inter-linkages dealing with trade, finance, flows of people and the like and the study of these linkages is intensive amongst policy analysts and scholars.

(c) East Asia - ideas/cultures

Bodies of ideas are carried in tradition. These provide intellectual resources in various forms (great/little traditions, discourses or ideologies) and agents understand their worlds with reference to these resources. It is true of political elites, those in the corporate world, active participants within the public sphere and it is true, most generally, of all those agents within the ordinary social world.

In East Asia following the Pacific War, newly established elites, having secured power, had to deal with the demands of the international system and their domestic populations. In this situation they had to think about states, nations and development.

In regard to the idea of states - agents must read and react to ideas available within the international community and within their domestic territory. Acharya (2010) has used the idea of 'constitutive localism' to grasp the exchange of elites with external demands. State making in East Asia stressed non-interference. The legacies of colonialism plus the ideas linked to the cold war (as in invitations to join great power alliance organisations) underscored the domestic demand for differentiation from neighbours and distance from external great powers. In regard to the idea of nation/identity - tradition carries the resources and lessons of the past into the present. Here two ideas have picked up this aspect of ideas/cultures: collective memory and the national past. The idea of collective memory points to the multiple ways in which social memory is sustained; thus in East Asia the history of the twentieth century can be grasped in terms of family memories, community memory and organisational or institutional memory. The history of the century was filled with the collapse of state-empire systems followed by the coalescence of sovereign states (a process filled with violence) and these episodes have been read into the collective memory of polities in the form of the idea of the national past. The idea of the national

past points to the collective memory of a polity. It is a set of ideas that record where the polity came from, what its current status is and where it might ideally go in the future. It maps out the trajectory of a polity over time. The construction is a contested compromise between elite level ideas and popular ideas. In East Asia the collapse of empires and the coalescence of sovereign states is read in numerous ways as different experiences are read into different national pasts. These national pasts record both domestic experiences and exchanges with other polities; these memories are not scholarly records, rather they are stylized memories.

In respect of the idea of development-agents read the system-generated demand for 'effective nation state-hood' (which sketched out a future whereby newly independent states would become liberal democracies, running liberal markets within the overarching frame of Bretton Woods ordered international liberal trading) in various ways around a goal of national development (effective in some cases, a thin cover for corruption and cronyism in others).

In terms of the core concerns of social constructivists, it is clear that the development trajectory of post-war East Asia has been shaped by the sets of ideas with which political agents, policy makers and others have used to make sense of their situations. Some of this finds expression in organisations: domestically, the familiar repertoire of flags, parades and anthems; internationally, a concern for what is now tagged 'soft power' via cultural activities, for example, acknowledged by ASEAN's Socio-Cultural Community-acknowledged by China's Confucius Institutes-and so on.

(d) East Asia-IPE and agents/structures

International political economy argues that elites must read and react to enfolding structural change in order to secure the livelihoods of their polities; some of these responses will be inevitable (as problems are recognised, understood and acted upon), whilst some will be more self-consciously selected (as problems are recognised, understood and then after reflection resolved). In East Asia elite understandings have been shaped by two contrasting pressures-first, security - a post-war preoccupation with state making, which has made security an issue for sovereign powers, thus as state-empires dissolved, new sovereign powers were concerned with borders, hence the possibilities for tensions. There are many potential state/state security

flashpoints in East Asia. Comparatively, there are none amongst members of European Union. The second, trade-the post-war concern for national development has been widely successful, the countries of the region are prosperous and they are interlinked.

In terms of the core concerns of IPE scholars, East Asia has shown many of the traits which go to make up regional linkages, it has also shown some of the traits which go to make up regionalism-there are self-conscious organisations devoted to the general interests of region members.

So, to reiterate, regions are not simple givens, they are made as local elites read and react to enfolding circumstances and international political economy captures this process in the slow creation of dense networks of inter-linkages built around the business of livelihood together with the elite concern for ordering these exchanges, thus the slow shift from acknowledging regionalization to embracing regionalism to the collective creation of a region. However, whilst theoretical interpretation can suggest lines of development, as ever such speculations are subject to the vagaries of political life, the key is always the inevitable contingency of political life for nothing is certain.

All that said, for the moment, it would seem that two issues must be addressed in any analysis of international politics in East Asia: trade and the business of livelihood plus security and the business of sustaining peaceful international political relationships.

East Asia region: Trade and the role of overarching goals

As noted, international relations scholarship has produced several approaches to international politics and each can be unpacked in terms of the typical problems that it identifies: thus realism is concerned with questions of industrial and military power balances; liberalism and interdependence approaches are concerned with production and trade relations; social constructivism is concerned with patterns of understanding; and finally international political economy is concerned with the ways in which agents read and react to enfolding structural circumstances in order to secure livelihood for their polities.

Amongst international relations scholars and using these resources in various mixes, two particular issues within international politics in East Asia are salient, that is, they are the subject of repeated discussion: trade and security.

First, the business of trade-these concerns produce the task of ordering economic exchanges within the region and between it and other regions (this preoccupation unpacks into a long involved agenda of concerns looking at rules in respect not merely of trading in finished goods but also the broader agendas concerned with the rules governing production, finance and systems of regulation).

Second, the concern for security-here the focus turns to the maintenance of peaceful international political relations and as with trade there are multiple concerns (military forces, technologies, alliances and so on) plus there is one particular problem, that is, the ever-present nature of the remembered past, which in turn points to the task of coming to terms with the lessons and legacies of history, here the violence of the twentieth century, which points to the task of revisiting received national pasts.

Trade relations I: Globalization, regionalization and regional organisations

Recent decades (Godement, 1996) have seen many debates about economic development in East Asia and two ideas have been prominent - globalization and regionalization-while at the same time a number of regional organisations have been created. These debates run-on and new organisations continue to be suggested.

(a) Globalization and regionalization

Globalization is often presented as an unfolding process-scientific advance, economic interchange, plus social, cultural and political convergence-movement towards an integrated global system: proponents of this view include neo-liberal theorists such as Francis Fukuyama (1992), business theorists such as Ohmae (1987; 1990), and political theorists; (Held & McGrew, 2002) modest opponents of this view speak of internationalization and prefer to track detail of inter-linkages (Hirst & Thompson, 1992); whilst radical opponents say globalization is mostly

rhetoric designed to serve the political project of expanding the reach of neo-liberal economic system centred on USA and EU (Higgot, 2001)

Regionalization is also seen as a discernible trend-recent years have seen areas of the global system develop dense economic linkages and thereafter deepening social linkages and cultural/political linkages: proponents suggest that whereas globalization is (probably) hype, regionalization seems to be happening (Hirst & Thompson, 1992); proponents point to the European Union, ASEAN or groupings such as Mercosur and thereafter to sub-regional activity (Pearl River Delta, Greater Mekong Sub-Regional System, SIJORI and others); anxious commentators draw a distinction between 'open regionalism' and 'closed regionalism' where the former integrates economies, does not discriminate against outsiders and leads towards globalization, whilst the later distinguishes members and non-members and does not lead towards globalization (Garnaut, 2004).

Regions can be seen as social constructions - thus a further line of commentary suggests starting with regions not as simple givens or accretions of activities but as more or less self-consciously constructed (Rana, 2013); the results of projects of regionalism: proponents (Bernard 1996) of this view point to the ways in which economic activities can be gently coordinated (for example Japanese aid, trade and foreign direct investment in East Asia (Orr, 1990; Katzenstein, 2005) building networks of activity that slowly encompass not merely the economic spheres but also social, cultural and finally political as formal institutional mechanisms are established (thus for example EAEC or ASEAN plus 3 or the East Asian Summit) (Acharya, 2000); doubters respond in several ways, some reject the constructivism as an implausible approach whose results are not worth the effort, others affirm the key role of states in any regional organisation suggesting that what is agreed today can be revised tomorrow, whilst others affirm the over-riding power of liberal market relations anticipating that regions are merely way-points in the move towards a global system (Held, 2002).

If it is asked-why does any of this globalization/regionalization debate matter, then there are two broad groups of answers: for political actors and for scholars. First, political actors in the global community look at East Asia and see a rising regional power, maybe one with a future great power at its centre. Grasping the dynamics of the region is a necessary condition of dealing

successfully with it; both in the short term, making deals today, and in the longer term, where the issue of setting global rules becomes an issue. Second, scholars look at East Asia and they see something that is new. In the years since the end of the Pacific War the region has experience great upheaval-decolonization, civil war and revolution, great power proxy wars-and yet it has become rich. Scholars are concerned with understanding this record of achievement and with the ways in which any explanations of the success feeds back into the intellectual traditions that they inhabit-in terms of Western type social science, one issue has caught the attention of many analysts, that is, the notion of the developmental state.

(b) Dynamics at global, regional and local levels

Setting aside these debates about globalization and regionalization, a comprehensive approach to these issues can be found in international political economy, which looks at the ever-changing interaction between structures and agents as human beings engage in the social production of livelihood (Strange, 1988; Giddens, 1979). International political economy, which asserts that politics and economics are two sides of the same coin, looks to the activities of identifiable groups: crucially, elite groups must read and react to enfolding structural circumstances and formulate their projects –the economic position/sector they inhabit is the source of their political power-their political power is used to advance the interests of that economic position/sector. One implication of this approach is that the present structural pattern of the global system is contingent, it is the out-turn of multiple interactions pursued over time and viewed this way claims about the inevitability of globalization or regionalization look far too simple.

Actual patterns of interaction are likely to be very complex: schematically, it is possible to speak of changing structural patterns at global, regional and local levels and it is the mix of these three particular dynamics of change that will determine the actions of the elite and subsequently the path of any particular country or territory. First, here are global level dynamics: thus the Bretton Woods machinery (IMF, World Bank, WTO, Wall Street-together making the Washington Consensus) that sets the rules of international trade/finance, plus the existing flows within the global system (goods, people and money). Second, there are regional level dynamics:

thus Japanese aid and production networks; Tiger economy cross-regional investments; Chinese cross-regional investments; plus the links making up the production and commercial network of Greater China (Hong Kong, Taiwan and China) (Beeson & Stubbs, 2012; Cheng, 2012). And third, there are local level dynamics: patterns of sectors/agents within a country, their various responses (including domestic winners and losers) and hence various projects. An international political economy analysis would say that it is the mix of these dynamics that shapes the local situation. One key idea to emerge from debate has been the idea of the ‘developmental state’ which points to complex local alliances oriented towards advancing the national economy (Stubbs, 2009). And tracking the unfolding trajectories of countries in East Asia, it is clear that domestic agents-state and corporate - have both adapted the global rules and developed linkages amongst themselves, that is, these agents do not simply join in an otherwise undifferentiated unitary global system.

(c) Regional organizations

The elites of the countries in East Asia must read and react to changing circumstances and one aspect has been the construction of regional organisations. East Asia is home to a multiplicity of organisations; some involving extra-regional powers, others, informed by local agendas; and here-as elsewhere-the exchanges between various agents over the design of organisations can be awkward. There are very many organisations-some active, some rather inactive whilst earlier efforts have failed to sustain any role-there is typically political manoeuvring around their role-such concerns about membership/role have found expression in the distinction between open and closed regionalism-a further anxiety now centres on accommodating an emergent China (Rozman, 2012)-these are often the anxieties of outsiders-another way of coming at the last noted issue it to recall the nature of the pre-colonial Sino-centric tribute system and ask whether any of these ideas have run through into the present-concerns for culture, hierarchy and reciprocity (Kang, 2012).

Some early organisations were concerned with security questions (SEATO-the US/Japan Security Agreement-US/South Korea Security Agreement-US/Taiwan Security Agreement-USSR/PRC-PRC/North Korea) because in the period of decolonization and cold war governments

were preoccupied with geo-strategy, that is, the business of securing and maintaining control over a territory. However, as the countries of the region became prosperous, concerns shifted towards economics and so as decolonization fell into the past and cold war tensions eased, countries in the region began to focus more on geo-economics and a newer set of regional institutions became important and whilst most are officially focused on economic issues some commentators think that they have proved most successful in the political sphere.

The 1997 Asian financial crisis provoked some actions-but, in contrast, say, to the European Union, relatively modest advances-Webber (2010) notes that post-97 crisis many commentators spoke of greater integration but in the event it has not happened, instead there are lots of bi-lateral and mini-lateral trade deals-in respect of security ASEAN plus three (APT) is the closest to a regional organisation-for Webber, the region is too dispersed to come together. However, one might add, that whilst that could be the case there is no reason to expect it to replicate the historical experiences of other places.

Acharya (2010) discusses the evolution of regional organisations detailing the subtle exchanges between available ideas (taken from former colonial powers or new international organisations), the concerns of local area neighbours (thus, other ex-colonies) and the demands of replacement elites with their own domestic cultures and politics.

Acharya criticizes mainstream international relations scholarship for being US/EU-centric and for looking at East Asian regionalism from the outside-thereby missing the key role of local agents. Instead, ideas are taken from historical and sociological institutionalism-and the materials of social constructivism are reworked in order to acknowledge the work of local agents-the approach is labelled 'constitutive localization'. When local agents are put back into the story then Asian regionalism can be seen to be the result of complex exchanges: domestic (within local countries), regional (between local countries) and global (between local countries and the major power centres in particular the USA and European Union)-the upshot has been a particular concern for sovereignty (in particular, the idea of non-intervention), a preference for consultative and consensus building exchanges and a reluctance to go for legally based formal organisations. Acharya argues that when the region is viewed in these terms, it is clear that a distinctive and successful type of regionalism has been developed.

A series of local organisations are noted-formed in the years immediately following decolonization and in the period of the early cold war-they provided a vehicle for local concerns:

- Asian Relations Conference-in 1947 (New Delhi) and 1949 (New Delhi)
- Colombo Powers Meeting-1954 (Colombo)
- Asia-Africa Bandung Conference-in 1955 (Bandung)
- ASEAN-1967 (Bangkok).

Acharya (2010) argues that their key preoccupation in respect of international politics was with sovereignty and non-intervention-this expressed anxieties about former colonial powers, current great powers (with their cold war competition) and a looser worry about revolutionary groups (in particular those inspired by or linked to the CCP)-they avoided formal bodies, so embraced idea of process diplomacy-they avoided formal collective defence organisations (such as NATO), so embraced the looser idea of security cooperation-and they turned their thinking to their common problem of development-hence the idea of developmental regionalism.

In respect of Southeast Asia, Acharya argues that the early meetings fed into the construction of ASEAN and the idea of the ASEAN Way (Acharya 2010, p.79). ASEAN is the longest established regional body in Southeast Asia-in addition to its internal consultations it now seeks to engage with other countries-it has linked with other countries in East Asia-it has sought dialogue partners of a wider international stage-it has also developed the idea of sub-regional development zones-there are now four-these are instances of state-led local-level developmental regionalism (Dent & Richter 2011). It is often criticized for its ineffectiveness but it has nevertheless survived for over thirty years and has helped the countries of the region solidify their identities and positions within their region and wider global system. It has accomplished this via the membership of ASEAN-now ten-and there are a number of related organisations which reach out to wider groupings - ASEAN plus 3 (1997), the ASEAN Regional Forum (1994) and so on.

It might be noted that ASEAN and its affiliates do not exhaust the list of relevant organisations. Both the USA and the European Union have responded to the shifts and changes in the global system. Thus APEC (1989) is one of a sequence of trans-Pacific trade organisations that links-up the countries of the Pacific Rim. APEC seeks to link-up, in particular, the core East Asian countries and Australia and North America. The objectives are to foster trade and dialogue

and it has a secretariat to coordinate activity but no legally binding agreements. The organisation has been criticized for not achieving very much but it is not clear what it could achieve-East Asia's patterns of development are distinctive, not variants of the model of the USA. These debates-essentially about the character and rules of international trade (and politics)-are presently being recycled around discussions of the TPP (on-going). And, relatedly, ASEM (1996) - links the East Asian countries with the European Union-seeks to foster trade and dialogue and criticised as merely a talking shop.

By the late 1980s East Asia was an economically powerful region; its record was considered; its character debated; numerous lines of analysis were proposed; plus one line of criticism:

- East Asia had got the prices right, the free market line (World Bank, 1993)
- East Asian culture was the key, culturalist line celebrations of 'Confucianism
- the US role was crucial, the US hegemonic power line (Stubbs, 2005)
- the impact of the Second World War was crucial, historical shocks line (Preston, 2010)
- the role of crony capitalism, explained failure in 1997
- East Asia had used the developmental state, the political economy line (Stubbs, 2005; 2012)

Some lines of argument presented the East Asian experience as a variation of the historical experience of the West (thus East Asia was joining in and catching up); other lines of argument stressed that something novel had happened in East Asia (thus East Asia was joining in but it was not catching up because it was following its own trajectory). All these debates have in common that they note that something special is happening in East Asia: thereafter, the problem was to uncover the logic of this success story and sketch out its implications for the development of the region and the wider global system.

Trade relations II: Change and contemporary issues in East Asia

As the global wars of the middle of the twentieth century drew to a close, the United States of America assumed a dominant position-economically, militarily and-in Europe, certainly, culturally. As regards the economic aspects, the relative positions of East Asia, Europe and

America can be grasped in terms of a set of circles-in 1945 the USA is largest circle and it has approximately 50% global output, Europe and East Asia are much smaller; however, by 2008 (the dates of both the Beijing Olympics and the Lehman Brothers collapse) all three circles have grown much bigger but now the three circles are more or less the same size. The characteristic of these regional economies varies-within and between regions-but, in brief, all three regions now have sophisticated science based high-tech industrial economic cores. And the three regions also have extensive trading linkages-again, within and between the regions-such exchanges are sustained by complex systems of law and logistics-with fine details ordered via elaborate trade agreements.

(a) USA's changing economic relations with various parts of East Asia

Phase I 1945-71	Phase II 1971-85	Phase III 1985-08
Japan and Tigers	strongly engaged	strongly engaged
ASEAN	not engaged	some engagement
Indo China	not engaged	some engagement
China	not engaged	some engagement

The USA has been involved in trading with East Asia since the early nineteenth century-the trade missions of Admiral Perry to Japan, the declarations of the Open Door in respect of China and (more prosaically) a long-established whaling industry sourcing materials from around the Pacific. Flows of people might also be recalled-after the western movement across the continent was secure, Chinese and Japanese workers plus their families migrated to the USA. These links remained in place up until the disruptions of the Pacific War. After the war years economic relations were subordinate to the political concerns of cold war geo-strategy. The USA offered aid, technology and market access to the countries of Northeast Asia and they prospered until in phase two soaring trade imbalances began to hurt domestic US industry. Assorted import curbs were agreed that slowed but did not remove the problems. Matters were addressed with the 1985 Plaza Accords-ostensibly a technical economic discussion, but after the yen revaluation the

trade relationship became one of equals. Northeast Asia depends on USA for market and the USA depends on Northeast Asia for supplies of money.

The USA has been involved in Southeast Asia to a somewhat lesser degree-there had been early exchanges –in the very early days of the territory of Singapore colonial officials were complaining of American arms entering the territory -at the turn of the twentieth century Singapore was exporting tin and rubber to the American car and canning industries. Later, there was significant cold war related activity-Vietnam, plus counter-insurgency activity in other countries - American interest centred on Philippines and Thailand-military bases-thereafter as ASEAN moved forwards trade with USA grew-tropical agricultural products-multi-national corporation light manufactured exports to USA.

The USA has growing links with China-trade/finance-the USA is a major destination for Chinese manufactured exports-thus far mainly low and medium tech manufactures encompassing a vast range of inexpensive consumer goods but in the future high-tech exports are expected (computers, cars, high-speed railways, aircraft and perhaps nuclear power plants¹). The relationship is awkward.

The Beijing government needs continued economic growth to produce jobs, wages and legitimacy for the regime. The USA is wedded to post-war system of liberal free trade-it serves its large corporations well-however Chinese low/medium tech imports mean that domestic American production/jobs are lost-a further area of difficulty lies in high tech exports from USA to China as these are regarded as militarily sensitive-the relationship is clearly two-way-China needs the USA and the USA needs China-a further area of tension relates to finance-China has a large trade surplus - China has vast holdings of US dollars which are invested in the USA-it creates a strange mutual-dependency-goods flow one way and money moves in the other direction - China has been variously characterized by political agents in the USA-in the late forties as a communist dictatorship-more recently as a currency manipulator-presently as a strategic competitor - the

¹Reports in the *Financial Times* – April 2013 – discussed possible Chinese investments in UK nuclear plants.

most recent statements refer to a security pivot towards East Asia-Chinese policy makers speak in terms of peaceful rising-it is an uncomfortable relationship.

(b) EU' changing economic relations with various parts of East Asia

Phase I 1945-71	Phase II 1971-85	Phase III 1985-08
Residual colonial links	New Econ Cooperation	Expanding Econ Links
	Trade/EU imports	Trade/finance
		Two-way trade
		Two-way investment
Southeast Asia	Japan	Japan
	Tigers	Tigers
	ASEAN	ASEAN
		China

The countries of Europe have had trade relations with East Asia for centuries: the exchanges began as small groups of Europeans operated as traders within the existing networks (Frank, 1998)-at first, they were just one more group, later, as the modern world began to unfold its demands within Europe, these were, inevitably, transmitted to Southeast and East Asia. Whole areas were absorbed within European-centred systems of state-empires-either directly, as formal colonies-or indirectly, as informal empire, thus, large areas of China.

The Pacific War undermined these empires-formal and informal. After the war years local elites took their chance and a series of new states were formed and as newly established sovereign regimes began to order their affairs, long established economic links were re-ordered, some severely cut back. In Northeast Asia, countries occupied or supported by the USA reoriented their trade links. China, after the revolution, turned inwards and built links with the USSR. European involvement faded. Europeans retained some links with Southeast Asian countries.

In the 1970s along with European recovery and East Asian growth new economic linkages formed as imports/exports resumed. In the 1980s the trade and financial linkages deepened into major links-the EU became a major trading partner for East Asia-presently trade relations are strong.

(c) Inter-linkages are complex

The global system is now extensively interlinked. These links can be roughly summarized: production networks and flows of finished manufactured goods; financial networks and flows of money (investments, remittances, debt settlements, speculative hot money, illegal monies); social networks (flows of people-state and corporate business-leisure-migration (legal/illegal)); and cultural networks (flows of popular culture and high arts). Given this complexity, the task of managing economic activities and hence the crucial issue of livelihood has become ever more demanding (Pitakdumrongkit, 2013).

Trade relations III: Europe and East Asia - the role of overarching goals

East Asian regionalization and regionalism have often been compared to events in Europe, specifically, the development of the European Union. Commentators note the institutionally elaborate machinery of the European Union and the absence of such arrangements in East Asia. Cast in these terms, East Asian regionalism looks like a weak and underdeveloped enterprise but there is no reason to cast matters in these terms for the historical trajectories of the two geographical regions are quite different. In Europe, the twentieth century saw the collapse of state-empire systems centred on their metropolitan territories, which, thereafter had to acknowledge their contribution to the debacle that had overcome them, reconstruct their polities and seek a better style of interaction and thus war lead to a concern for unification. In East Asia, the twentieth century saw a complex process of exploitation and learning whereby polities shifted into the modern world, produced home-grown nationalisms and independence movements which took their chance as the state empire system dissolved to create new states, build nations and pursue development producing a concern for differentiation and distance from great powers. Or, in brief, East Asian elites have read and reacted to enfolding change and created thereby their

own historical development trajectory so there is no reason to suppose that East Asian regionalism should replicate the experience of Europe.

Cast in more abstract terms, it can be noted that social constructivists-including substantive work informed by international political economy-lodge social scientific argument making within cultures-the more philosophically sophisticated variants would argue that all human thinking is lodged within received cultures-they would, relatedly, reject notions of social science that borrow directly from the received model of the natural sciences-external, objective description plus explanation is not available-all social scientific thinking is lodged within cultures-a variant argument would be applied to the natural sciences (the difference between the two arenas of thought being that natural science is able to redeem its claims-that is, it works)-for social scientists confronted with evidently different cultures all this presents a dilemma-how to access the dynamics of other cultures-the key for those working within the interpretive critical tradition is dialogue-claims can be presented and debated.

So what can be said? In respect of the comparison of regionalism in Europe and in East Asia it is possible to offer an argument by analogy, which might illuminate something of the problems of contemporary East Asia.

(a) The euro crisis-predictions of collapse not borne out

The 2008 collapse of Lehman Brothers ushered in a period of crisis for the financial systems of America and Europe and there was extensive debate in the financial press about the reasons for the crisis, its precise nature and the manner in which it might be resolved.² At first, Europeans were rather relaxed about the crisis, viewing it as a largely Anglo-American problem, centred on the two great financial centres of Wall Street and the City of London and triggered by the American sub-prime mortgage market debacle. However, they have been obliged to change their positions as problems have come to light in banks and sovereigns in Ireland, Portugal, Greece and lately Cyprus. Other banks and sovereigns had similar problems-private debts and

²For an overview see special edition of *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 11(3).

consequent pressures on sovereign state finances. In the financial press these problems are generally granted: problems with banks, problems for sovereigns, plus intellectual issues have been noted, that is, the general acceptance of neo-liberal claims about the safety of financial markets, and regulators have been criticised for doing nothing much until the crisis broke.

Thereafter the financial press have made a further observation, namely that the authorities governing the euro currency have had difficulties in responding to the on-going crisis- firstly, there are design problems in the institutions of the euro so responding is technically difficult (first, multiple state memberships running their own state budgets and ordering their local economies-crucially, allowing banks to lend recklessly and build up unsustainable debts, second, a weak central machinery unable to discipline member states economic governance and third a nominally independent central bank which lacks the necessary powers to intervene in member states and financial markets) and secondly these problems are compounded by an inability of political leaderships to come to a decision as to how to resolve the crisis.

In summary, the crisis in Europe has had a number of features: problems with banks (inter alia - business models, systems of internal rewards, investment decisions, product offerings, instrumental behaviour in respect of law and regulation); problems with regulators (befuddled by bank manoeuvrings and neo-liberal ideology); problems with sovereign state financed bank rescue deals (as sovereign states bailed out banks domiciled within their territories, the credit worthiness of states in the global money markets came into question-creating further problems); institutional problems with coordinating action at EU level (European Union crisis responses were slow and European Union reform programmes were also slow); and problems with the overall political response (as failures in banking sector were re-labelled as failures in state with responsibility for the debacle thus shifted).

One aspect of these last two noted factors has been particularly interesting, specifically widespread scepticism amongst Anglo-American commentators in respect of the future of the euro currency. Here two lines were identifiable: first, arguments from liberal economic theory to the inevitability of the collapse of the euro; and second, arguments from liberal political hostility towards the political project of the European Union to the desirability of the collapse of the euro and consequent downgrading of European Union to a free trade zone. Yet to date, the euro

currency has survived; to date no members of the currency have withdrawn; and to date those member states which have had to seek help with bank bailouts have been subject to a severe policy regime of state expenditure cuts, wage cuts and programmes of liberal oriented regulatory reform and whilst popular displeasure has been evidenced in elections (as ruling parties have been ejected from power), popular support for membership of the euro continues. In brief, the defence of the euro has been strong (if amenable to all the criticisms noted earlier). It can be argued that this has been a political and moral decision. In the context of the financial crisis the overarching project of ever-closer union has found continued purchase not only amongst elites but also amongst the wider general population.

In Europe the overarching project of ever-closer union has been informed by memories of extreme violence-from 1914 to 1945 the continent was the location of a number of inter-linked episodes of violence-revolution, civil war and inter-state war-the upshot was a species of collective ruin. It is here that the moral core of the drive for European Union can be found-it is here that the determination to sustain the project of ever-closer union can be found-this is the proximate cause for the elite's protection of the euro currency.

The current euro crisis can be compared to the 1997 Asian financial crisis-(Beeson, 2011) compares the two crises-uncovering the nature of the problems and their unfolding consequences-indeed he argues that the two are in one way linked-currency reserves built up by East Asian countries after their crisis helped fuel the latter crisis by making available excess liquidity. But Beeson's concern is more with the impact of such crises on processes of regionalization and ideas of regionalism: first, the 1997 crisis provoked the development of some functional financial links in East Asia (Chiang Mai Agreement) but no wider project (thus the proposed Asian Monetary Fund was vetoed by the USA, provoking, later some hostility); second, the 1997 crisis provoked East Asian doubt about the Bretton Woods system, now seen as something of a servant of the USA/West; third, the 2010/12 crisis has discredited the familiar claims of neo-classical economics and the related doctrines of the inevitability of beneficent globalization, it has marginally weakened the influence of the USA and marginally strengthened the position of China; and fourth, it has weakened the attraction of the European Union's project.

All of which is apposite commentary except that the euro currency is still in place and reforms continue within the European Union in respect of financial regulation.

(b) An overarching goal in East Asia?

In respect of East Asia, and arguing by analogy, this experience points to the importance of a general agreement about the future of the region-not a plan or treaty or an organisation - but some broad general agreement, which can frame debate about particular issues and problems. Acharya (2010) finds the keys to an East Asian regionalism in the areas own history-the immediate post-war period saw elites concerned to secure an end to state-empire systems and concerned to escape from entanglements in security organisations dominated by great powers-so state sovereignty was stressed-the international political ethic of non-intervention was embraced-it was coupled to process diplomacy and it issued in a developmental regionalism-but it might be said that the developmental regionalism is somewhat understated or undersold-indeed a different stress is offered by Nair (2009), who writes of a 'frustrated regionalism' where many declarations have not pursued. In these terms greater visibility to the commitment to developmental regionalism might offer the region a way of replicating the commitments that Europeans find in the idea-taken from their history-of ever closer union. However, any significant deepening of linkages in the region would require significant new thinking - in respect of East Asia, further work would involve, not merely economic coordination but its political counterpart-here, amongst other things, there would be a requirement for a reconsideration of available national pasts.

All that said, regionalization-the slow mundane business of building practical links – continues-in recent decades economic, social and slowly political links have become stronger. There is no reason to suppose that this will not continue-however, there may be costs attached to the lack of a clear agreed goal and more awkwardly there are unresolved issues from earlier years and these are lodged in a system of international political relations that has stressed the distinctiveness and separateness of individual state projects.

East Asia Region: Security and the lessons and legacies of history

East Asia entered the modern world of science based industrial capitalism via foreign sponsored state-empire systems-European, American and later Japanese - in the early twentieth century this system began to collapse-metropolitan core powers experienced various conflicts-peripheral territories sought to reorder these systems - the process of collapse was attended by extensive violence-the upshot was the creation of much reduced nation states in the hitherto core areas along with numerous new states in the hitherto peripheral territories-newly empowered elites built states, created nations and sought to secure development - the routes into the modern world taken by these new states have been captured in various national pasts.

From these two points can be taken: first, the process of dissolution of state-empires was not smooth, often it was violent; and second, the subsequent creation of clearly delimited states plus the irruption of cold war concerns made the security of newly established states a central concern. Security remains a concern in East Asia (where, in contrast, it does not in Europe).

Security I: The record noted

The creation of the modern world-the underlying logic of the contemporary pattern of international politics-has its origins in the rise of science based industrialism in Europe-the creation of industrial capitalism flowed from contingent circumstances-it was of course mis-read in essentialist terms-the pattern of life was exported-the process of fostering the shift to the modern world involved both cooperation and coercion-there were numerous wars of colonial expansion-the systems thereafter established in turn had their own logics-a further round of cooperation and coercion-this time issuing in general system collapse-plus a round of catastrophic general warfare-thereafter, as state-empires dissolved and replacement states formed a further round of confusion unfolded-wars of collapse, wars associated with cold war competition between power blocs-plus, it might be noted, violence has continued into the present day, albeit of a more 'domestic' type (Hamilton-Hart, 2013). In all, the shift to the modern world in East Asia has been accompanied by extensive violence.

(a) Wars of Colonial Expansion

The shift to the modern world was fuelled by the dynamism of the industrial capitalist system, it involved extensive contacts between incoming traders and local powers, there was much cooperation-but the process did entail remaking extant forms of life-and it was accompanied by extensive violence (Preston, 2010).

(b) Wars of state-empire collapse

There were core tensions and peripheral tensions and in time the system failed. The breakdown produced general confusion and there were various conflicts. The system breaks down into generalized warfare-multiple participants, multiple locations and in time multiple memories - and the crisis resolved only when core powers are reconstituted as nation states and peripheral powers emerge as novel or reconstituted nation states-a long draw-out business, costing many lives.

(c) Wars of withdrawal, cold war and state making

The general crisis did not stop in August 1945, it continued, it flowed without a break into the wars of colonial withdrawal plus the related conflicts attached to the cold war. These last noted took place in Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia and China/Taiwan fuelled by routine and extensive American anti-communism (Hart, 2012).

In sum, the shift to the modern world in East Asia was accompanied by extensive violence-these experiences have shaped the creation of contemporary national pasts: hence the memories of war held by the Japanese elite (right wing and left wing); hence the memories of war held by the elite and people of China; hence the memories of war held by elite and peoples in South Korea; and hence the (rather different) memories of war held by elites and peoples in the countries of Southeast Asia. These memories work to divide East Asia.

Security II: Change and contemporary issues in East Asia

Presently, in East Asia, there are three key players, USA, Japan and China and there are significant secondary players in the Tiger economy countries and ASEAN. There are distinctive

contemporary issues, including legacies of collapse of empire, inter-state wars, decolonization, cold war plus the effects of decades of economic success on patterns of relationships within the region and between the region and the wider global system. International relations scholarship uses various approaches (Peou, 2012, in Beeson and Stubbs 2012)-as noted above-and has in recent years paid particular attention to issues of leadership and the notion of security considered in the widest sense. In regard to the former, the region has two contenders for leadership roles, China and Japan, the former is developing rapidly, the latter, presently, remains more advanced and as commentators note the two political elites clash repeatedly (ritually, over, say, Yasakuni Shrine; more directly over, say, Senkoku/Daiyou Islands (Dent, 2012; Beeson & Stubbs, 2012) and in respect of the latter, broad notions of security call attention to all aspects of the vitality of a state (Emmers, 2012; Beeson & Stubbs, 2012).

(a) USA- key power over last fifty years

The USA was deeply involved in the shift to the modern world in East Asia and had strong links with Japan, China and the Philippines. It had links throughout the region. After the Pacific War the USA emerged as the strongest military power in the region. Thereafter the cold war divided the region with one bloc focused on the USA and the other on China. The USA had allies in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Australia and New Zealand (Yahuda, 2011)

The cold war saw two major wars in the region: Korea (Cummings 1981, and Vietnam (Sheehan, 1989). The cold war saw a number of local rebellions, which were read in cold war terms: Philippines (Huk Rebellion); Malaysia (Emergency); and Indonesia (1965 Coup). The cold war also fixed in place a number of these conflicts: North/South Korea; Northern Islands (Japan/USSR); Taiwan (ROC/PRC); and the USA was not unsympathetic to the Thai military which staged numerous coups.

The end of the cold war and emergence of China has seen Washington reconsidering its overall stance. These matters became explicit with the policy of President Obama's government- the 'pivot towards East Asia':

- it remains the dominant military power in the region;

- it is no longer the dominant economy;
- but it has extensive industrial and financial links to region;
- Japan is now militarily strong/more independent minded;
- South Korea is less inclined to follow US line in regard to Korean peninsula;
- Taiwan is increasingly inclined to assert its status as a country;
- China is the major rising power;
- Australia, New Zealand and Singapore (Graham, 2013; Supriyanto, 2013) are regional allies, plus links are being remade with countries otherwise treated rather distantly (Limaye, 2010); and
- the region is home to significant Muslim populations with some relatively low level probably locally-generated insurgency activity.

The key issues today include:

- the pivot to East Asia - how to reconfigure alliances/forces in order to meet the challenge of the rising power of China (Resnick, 2013);
- how to manage problems in Northeast Asia (assisting neighbouring countries in managing North Korea);
- how to manage the slowly evolving Taiwan issue; and
- how to combat the radical Islamist networks in the region (Misalucha, 2011).

(b) Japan - established power

The peace constitution and the formal links with the USA are the keys. The constitution was written by the occupation authorities. Then the 1951 peace and security treaties bound Japan to the USA. The constitution/treaties gave Japan a low-profile diplomatic role. Politics found expression in economic nationalism. But this is now changing: first - the military relationship had a cold war origin but now has no clear rationale-the USA encourages Japanese military to raise profile in region but there are problems with the peace constitution and the business of official historical memory; second - the peace movement in Japan is strong and centres on the city of Hiroshima-the peace movement opposes the use of military forces by Japan-many in the population oppose the military links with the USA-key US military bases are in Okinawa and the

locals who distinguish themselves from the Japanese of the main islands oppose them strongly- the peace constitution is opposed by unreconstructed nationalists and they have influence in LDP- history textbooks are arena of ritual domestic/international conflict-the visits of senior politicians to the Yasakuni Shrine are also problematical-these issues coalesce around the business of memory-critics (foreign and domestic) claim that the Japanese elite has not acknowledged nor made recompense for the aggressive wars waged in East Asia by earlier generations

The military growth plus nationalists plus unsettled matters of memory from Pacific War make Japanese position in East Asia problematical-at the same time Japanese aid has flowed to East Asia in vast quantities-trade and foreign direct investment have followed and made a major contribution to the present wealth of the entire region - to commentators outside the region the problematical position of Japan in the region looks like an unnecessary problem - however all countries have their domestic politics and official memories of wartime are awkward to address- for example there is little public debate in USA or Britain on the morality (or military effectiveness) of mass bombing of cities in Germany and Japan during the Second World War and Pacific War.

Japanese relationships vary with different parts of East Asia: first - Japan's links with ASEAN countries are relatively good-lots of aid, trade and foreign direct investment-most Japanese aid is directed towards East Asia - after Asian financial crisis Japan made further aid available to East Asia-it also organised Chiang Mai agreement 1999 for 'currency swop' arrangements (a way of protecting countries against financial market speculators); second - Japan's links with China are awkward-the history of relationships in modern period is poor-a series of wars-they are both now significant military powers-they are both strong economic powers-much Japanese aid and foreign direct investment has gone to China-Japan and China have extensive economic links - both Japan and China are growing military/diplomatic presences in East Asia and as the role of USA comparatively declines the relationship between these two powers assumes a greater prominence.

Japan in global system-the country is a global economic power-it has a large aid budget (although most is focused on East Asia)-it makes major contributions of money/diplomatic effort to the UN-it supported peacemaking in Cambodia - a key objective is a permanent seat on the

Security Council-the UN has been a major arena for Japanese diplomatic activity-a route back to respectability within international community.

The key issues include:

- how to secure a permanent seat on the UN security council
- how to revise the peace constitution
- whether or not to go nuclear
- how to manage changing relations with USA, recently, the TPP (Robles, 2013; Soble, 2013)
- how to manage relationships with Northeast Asian neighbours
- how to manage the rise of China where this includes uneasy relations in Northeast Asia, Japanese links with Taiwan and the Senkoku/Daiyou issue (Morris, 2013)
- how to build wider alliances within Asia (Mathur, 2013; Shankar, 2013).

(c) China - rising power

China was formed in context of inter-state war and civil war. During the Pacific War the USA had supported Nationalist China-this stance was carried over into the period of civil war-the CCP secured military victory - factions within Washington spoke of 'the loss of China'-China supported the North Korean government-its troops fought against USA-the situation stabilized after 1953 into a cold war pattern-Chinese government's pursuit of an autarchic state socialism meant a low international profile-alliance with the Soviet Union 1950-58-broken-rapprochement with USA and Nixon visit in 1972-a period of triangular diplomacy began. In 1978 Deng's reforms begin -- stability and growth domestically mean that country becomes more of a player in global politics - China slowly becomes more engaged with international community-the 1989 Tiananmen Square demonstrations damage this process-thereafter there is slow recovery-further economic advances-in time resumption of diplomatic linkages. The late 1990s and early twenty-first century have seen further economic and political integration within global system - Beijing 2008 symbolized the recovery of great power status.

China continues to integrate into the international community and confronts a number of issues-local, sub-regional, regional and global: first - relations with Japan are awkward-

competition for role in East Asian political networks-direct competition over resources within nautical exclusive zones-the issue of war/memory routinely emerges (Japanese nationalists strike poses and provide an opportunity for Chinese government to play the nationalist card for benefit of domestic audience); second - regional problems-managing relations with Taiwan-much trade plus measured nationalist bluster-a distinctive ritual diplomatic status competition; and third - China has growing links with ASEAN-problems of accessing oil in South China Sea now seen as resolvable-issue of Chinese settled in region is sometimes awkward; fourth- relations with USA are uneasy-much trade and much mistrust-trade volumes are not in balance-financial flows are problematical-American military budget is huge-the Chinese military budget is much smaller but growing; fifth- relations with European Union are good-trade-no diplomatic/military anxieties or tensions; and sixth, generally, the Chinese elite is nationalist and they read their circumstances in these terms-the recovery of status lost in shift to modern world (Callaghan & Barabantseva, 2011; Ho, 2013).

The key issues include:

- managing links with Japan (history/politics, security and trade)
- deepening links with South Korea (trade)
- managing links with North Korea (alliance, aid, migrants, collapse) (Yoon, 2013)
- managing relations with Taiwan
- upgrading and reorienting the military (from low tech to modern high tech and from a multiple role focus (security and nation building) to a professional focus (security and war fighting)
- managing the relationship with the USA
- working with ASEAN (Li & Zhang, 2013)
- deepening positive links with the European Union
- deepening positive links with Africa (resources/trade)
- continuing to raise very slowly the profile of the country on the global stage.

(d) Tiger economies

The international relations of Taiwanese government are dominated by the legacies of empire, civil war and cold war: first - the country was transferred to Japan at the end of the Sino-Japanese war 1894/5-the country was developed as a colonial holding-at the end of the Pacific War the country was transferred to the Republic of China whose leaders retreated there at end of the civil war-local Taiwanese suppressed-the country developed within the American economic/military sphere-elected president in 1990-subsequent rise of a clear Taiwanese identity; second-the key ally is the USA-economic, military and diplomatic-military guarantor; third - core preoccupation is China-country has been separated from mainland for over a century yet Beijing insists on reunification. And, additionally, there is a resource-diaspora links - China, Taiwan and Hong Kong plus overseas Chinese networks are referred to as 'Greater China' and this points to strong economic incentives for cooperation.

South Korea/North Korea-the legacies of empire and cold war continue to dominate this divided country. So, first, South Korea is linked to Japan, USA and global market place-the relationships with Japan and the USA are awkward; there is residual Korean hostility towards Japan in regard to empire-there are symbolic issues such as comfort women - Japan has resident Korean minorities who have in past been discriminated against-yet the trade links are strong; there is popular opposition to the US military-the cold war has left the country divided and the border is heavily militarized; and in recent years South Korea has attempted to engage the North in diplomatic dialogue, social welfare confidence building exchanges and some economic activities-one fear in the South is of the collapse of the North (Teo, 2013; Raska, 2013). Then, second, North Korea was devastated by the Korean War-there is no peace treaty resolving that war-the economy is backward-the people poor-the regime inward looking-the country has few diplomatic friends-possession of nuclear weapons plus potential for domestic collapse make it a problem for its neighbours-it has used these to extract money and resources from its neighbours and the USA-recently Chinese government has offered support for sanctions.

(e) The countries of ASEAN

The organization has been a success and conflicts between members have been largely avoided as the organisation has helped define countries and locate them within the international community. Acharya (2010) argues that the organisation was shaped by its environment and the concerns of founding elites-in particular a desire to escape both post-colonial entanglements and those on offer from competing great powers-to this might be added the domestic concerns with state making, nation building and the pursuit of development-for the region, Acharya reports, the episode shaped their concern for sovereignty, non-interference, process diplomacy, security cooperation and overall developmental regionalism.

Today ASEAN comprises an elaborate set of consultative mechanisms (tracks one, two and three) and members affirm the ASEAN Way -it means that diplomatic exchanges are governed by a set of informal rules-consensus seeking-cooperation seeking-no involvement in each others' internal affairs-the organisation proceeds via numerous meetings.

There are internal issues for ASEAN members, these include: first, discussions over economic development plans-there have been many initiatives but comparatively modest action-the economies are competitive and externally oriented rather than complimentary-however recent moves point to freeing up trade (Ho, et al., 2013; Trajano, 2013); second, conflicts over border demarcations (recently Philippines/Malaysia); third, problems with minorities within countries-Muslims in southern Thailand - Muslims in southern Philippines-Chinese minorities in many countries-differing situations/problems; fourth, problems of minorities in border areas-refugee camps (Thai/Burma border; East/West Timor border); fifth, links of minorities overseas-radical Muslim groups may be linked to Middle East (Ramakrishna, 2013); sixth, illegal migrant workers-workers accumulate then sometimes get pushed back home; seventh, legal migrant workers-sometimes treated simply as reserve army-poor conditions and liable to be sent home; eighth, domestic political advance (Kenawas & Fitriani, 2013; Kenawas, 2013; Osman, 2013) and human rights (Narine, 2012); ninth, general issues of reforming the machinery of ASEAN-the idea of constructive engagement with problems of fellow members was raised (initially provoked by the situation in pre-reform Myanmar).

There are external issues for ASEAN have included issues related both to Southeast Asia and the wider sphere of East Asia:

first, the organization continues to be active and to make links with other countries (in this way it serves its members diplomatically); second, ASEAN has sought to engage China (Cheng-Chwee, 2008; Ba, 2011)-Japan-USA (they are designated as dialogue partners and this lets ASEAN present itself within international community)-the South China Sea is one particular issue and it involves numerous stands-rising China, US pivot and energy security (Ba, 2011; Fravel, 2011); third, ASEAN now sits at the centre of a number of international organisations. Acharya (2000, 2010) argues that ASEAN can be associated with a distinct East Asian regionalism-the argument is rooted in historical institutionalism-this allows the author to track the social production of ideas about the region and to identify those which proved acceptable (and which perhaps found expression in the architecture of regional organisations) and those that did not (and which fell by the way-side).

Security III: Europe and East Asia - the surprising costs of success

As with trade issues, in respect of security issues second argument by analogy can be made which draws in potential lessons from European experience. Over the post-Second World War period, the two regions have been successful, that is, after numerous catastrophic conflicts in the early part of the twentieth century they have recovered and have secured material, social and cultural/political advance. In both cases the cold war had the effect of creating dividing lines within the region - bloc systems. The liberal market oriented blocs allied to the crucial post-1945 global power, the USA, prospered, whilst the state-socialist oriented blocs allied to the less powerful double centre of Moscow and Beijing fared less well and had to await reforms before their economies advanced. Nonetheless, today both regions are successful: both have recovered from the general crisis that accompanied the dissolution of the state-empire system and both now confront the problems of success.

In the case of the European Union discussions about the future revolve around the urgent need to deepen integration so as to correct mistakes made in the creation of the euro currency system-this is not a simple task-the EU has advanced as an elite-led project-populations have

supported or acquiesced in the project-however, today, a long debated alleged problem has been made acute by the crisis-that is, the 'democratic deficit'-further advance in respect of deepening the Union will-it is said-require rather more explicit democratic consent than has been the case with earlier phases in the construction of the Union. These amount to a renewed push for the creation of a European demos-a democratic community-and this requires, amongst other things, a sense of a common identity-thin will do-and this requires returning to the sources of political cultural identity in collective memory and the national past-in simple terms, Europeans must write a European history of Europe.

In the case of East Asia discussions about the future seem to be much more muted-there is no overall goal-but there is (Acharya's argument) a process of developmental regionalism-slow, dialogic, consensual-fine-but the region has evident tensions-left-over issues from decolonization and cold war-new issues revolving around the tensions of rapid economic and social change-more coordination implies more dialogue-a technical line, appealing to globalization is available-but on an argument by analogy from the European experience it will not be enough-an explicit programme will be required-thin will do-but again this would entail amongst other things looking at collective memories and national pasts - it might also be added that outsider discussion cast in terms of the desirability and eventual inevitability of the emergence of liberal democratic political systems are likely to be disappointed-the region's historical trajectory is distinct and cast in these terms there is no reason to expect any direct replication of 'Western' models (such expectations are naïve Western-centrism or propaganda)-the trajectory has produced distinctive polities-local elites seized control, established their projects (disseminated ideas and ordered action) and have subsequently accumulated further ideas and actions-result is not liberal-democracy, rather, strong states wedded to national development (Case, 2002; Dowdle, 2012; Beeson & Stubbs, 2012).

The record of the two regions-success-implies that received national pasts will have to be revisited-the trajectories inaugurated in the wake of the general crisis have run on for some fifty plus years-individual countries have recovered and advanced-the two regions have recovered and advanced-the global system is no longer configured as it was in the wake of the general crisis-patterns of understanding formulated then are no longer adequate for today-the surprising cost of

success is the requirement to revisit the past-to rework national pasts-only through this process of reflection can routes to the future be successfully engineered

All that said, security remains problematical-there are left-overs from cold war days-there are contemporary issues which grow out of thirty plus years of remarkable success-revisiting these trajectories, detailing the history of evident inter-linkages will require some reconsideration of received self-images-social constructivist analysis plus the argument by analogy point to the reconsideration of inherited national pasts-the key to upgrading the security of all in the region.

Trade and security - the keys to regional success

Before the slow rise of the modern world of industrial capitalism East Asia was the centre of the global economy-rich and powerful with Europe and America peripheral and unimportant-but European and American agents slowly joined in existing East Asian systems of social production-these existing systems were slowly remade-East Asia became a subordinate periphery in modern industrial capitalist system-it took the political form of a system of state-empires. It was always going to be temporary. The general crisis 1911-75 saw extensive dislocation-finally it ended bit by bit with the establishment of regimes dedicated to national development-a crucial element was the Pacific War - this was part of the general crisis and it destroyed the European/American empires - the industrial capitalist system in East Asia was reconfigured-local elites took political power and sought a better position or niche within the global industrial capitalist system-they sought this via projects of national development-the institutional mechanism for the political and economic project was the developmental state.

Each elite ordered trajectory reveals a specific mix of global, regional and local political and economic factors as local actors use the developmental state to pursue their own distinctive projects-success runs through a sequence-Japan, Tigers, Southeast Asia and China-success is the major part of the story but there are two other elements-continuing underdevelopment in much of Southeast Asia and inland China and in the region a growing environmental catastrophe.

Success has been debated: - political actors sought to grasp the implications of shifting patterns of political and economic power; - policy analysts wondered what procedures might be replicable elsewhere; and - scholars sought to understand the reasons for the success. All agreed

that the record in East Asia was remarkable-much debate revolved around the nature of the developmental state, the debate was re-visited during the Asian financial crisis and the debate has opened up once again with the issue of East Asian region. Today it is clear that East Asia has sketched out its own trajectory in the on-going shift to the modern world of science-based urban industrial society (originating in Europe and the West and thereafter exported around the planet-but always assuming local forms that is, the shift to the modern world does not mean 'Westernization').

In the years following the irreversible collapse of state-empire systems (European, American and Japanese) replacement elites build states, invented nations and pursued development-first - today in terms of trade, East Asia is an increasingly integrated region-second - today in terms of security, East Asia is a divided region. Arguing by analogy from the experience of Europe, it could be said that (deeper) economic integration would require (deeper) security cooperation-that is, political cooperation-this would require the creation of an overarching project for the region-and this in turn would require recognition of mutual interests-and this in turn would require a reconsideration of existing national pasts.

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