

DEMOCRACY, DEVELOPMENTAL STATE AND NEO-AUTHORITARIANISM¹

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ABSTRACT

This article aims to study democracy, developmental state and neo-authoritarian theories as many countries have entered the state of neo-authoritarian developmental states without necessarily being authoritarian states. Therefore, the author would like to understand how the states use development and economic growth as excuses to govern the markets. As well, the author practices literature review and documentary research to explore the theories and cases and conclude that democracy is not necessary when it comes to economic development and, on the other hand, authoritarianism is more effective for the countries to rapidly develop as it allows the countries to operate their chain of command.

Developmental state theory was first mentioned by Charmer Johnson in describing Japanese context that its government had intervened the market

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in 1980-1990. Japan had been the model for economic development for developing countries in Asia and it was discovered that developmental state concept was implemented hand in hand with nationalist policies to assure that politics and economy would be operated towards the same direction, and to build cultural frame that the state is of and for the nation. In some cases, the state might have to “get the price wrong” to secure the nation’s targeted industries which is opposite to neoclassical economics’ idea of “getting the price right”. Apart from Japan, Korea and Taiwan are also models of developmental state where Taiwan is known for being neo-developmental state because it uses import-substitution industrialization and gives both direct and indirect support to private sector. However, states cannot freely impose economic policies in globalization era as international organizations are also in the picture. Therefore, they need to adapt economic policies to cope with globalization.

Neo-authoritarian developmental state idea in Southeast Asian and Asian countries was formed by economic policies of Singapore and China that the states lead economic policies and reduce importance of democracy while putting primacy of politics in place as the main force that lets the states implement neo-authoritarian developmental state policies more effectively. As well, China is a model of a country that its economy has grown steadily though it is not a liberal democratic country. This article aims to clarify developmental state idea and neo-authoritarianism.

KEYWORDS: Developmental State/ Neo-Authoritarianism/ Democracy/
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บทคัดย่อ

บทความนี้ต้องการศึกษาทฤษฎีประชาธิปไตย รัฐพัฒนาการ และอำนาจนิยมใหม่ เนื่องจากหลายประเทศได้เข้าสู่ภาวะการเป็นรัฐพัฒนาการอำนาจนิยมใหม่โดยที่ไม่จำเป็นต้องเป็นรัฐอำนาจนิยม ดังนั้น ผู้เขียนต้องการทำความเข้าใจว่ารัฐสามารถใช้การพัฒนาและการเติบโตทางเศรษฐกิจมาเป็นข้ออ้างในการควบคุมตลาดได้อย่างไร และผู้เขียนได้ใช้วิธีทบทวนวรรณกรรมและศึกษาเอกสารต่าง ๆ ในการเขียนบทความนี้และได้ข้อสรุปว่าประชาธิปไตยไม่ใช่สิ่งที่จำเป็นเมื่อเป็นเรื่องการพัฒนาทางเศรษฐกิจ และในทางตรงกันข้ามหากประเทศใช้การบริหารตามแนวคิดอำนาจนิยมจะสามารถพัฒนาระบบเศรษฐกิจได้มีประสิทธิภาพมากกว่าเพราะเป็นการสั่งการผ่านโครงสร้างการบังคับบัญชา

แนวคิดรัฐพัฒนาการ หรือรัฐที่กระทำการพัฒนาเริ่มใช้ครั้งแรกในการอธิบายสภาวะการณ์ที่รัฐเข้ามาแทรกแซงกลไกตลาดในประเทศญี่ปุ่น ในช่วงปี ค.ศ. 1980-1990 โดยชาร์เมอร์ จอห์นสัน ซึ่งญี่ปุ่นถือว่าเป็นต้นแบบการพัฒนาทางเศรษฐกิจให้กับประเทศกำลังพัฒนาหลายประเทศในภูมิภาคเอเชีย ซึ่งในหลายครั้งการใช้แนวคิดรัฐพัฒนาการจะใช้ควบคุมไปกับนโยบายแบบชาตินิยมเพื่อให้การพัฒนาเศรษฐกิจและการเมืองไปในทิศทางเดียวกัน รวมถึงเป็นการสร้างกรอบวัฒนธรรมให้คนในชาติว่ารัฐนั้น

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เป็นรัฐแห่งชาติและจะดำเนินงานเพื่อชาติ และในบางกรณีรัฐจะต้องทำให้กลไกราคาบิดเบือนหากจะเป็นไปเพื่อประโยชน์ของอุตสาหกรรมหลักที่เป็นเป้าหมายในการพัฒนาของชาติ ซึ่งเป็นวิธีการที่ตรงกันข้ามกับแนวความคิดเศรษฐศาสตร์คลาสสิกใหม่ที่รัฐต้องทำให้กลไกราคาถูกต้องเสมอ นอกจากประเทศญี่ปุ่นแล้วยังมีประเทศเกาหลีและไต้หวันที่เป็นแบบอย่างประเทศรัฐพัฒนาการ แต่ไต้หวันถูกวางอยู่ในประเภทรัฐพัฒนาการใหม่เนื่องจากใช้การผลิตเพื่อทดแทนการนำเข้าและการวางนโยบายเศรษฐกิจเพื่อสนับสนุนภาคเอกชน อย่างไรก็ตามในยุคโลกาภิวัตน์การวางนโยบายทางเศรษฐกิจของประเทศจะไม่สามารถทำได้โดยอิสระเพราะมีองค์การระหว่างประเทศเข้ามาร่วมควบคุม ทำให้ประเทศรัฐพัฒนาการต้องปรับนโยบายให้สอดคล้องกับโลกาภิวัตน์

แนวคิดรัฐพัฒนาการอำนาจนิยมใหม่ในกลุ่มประเทศเอเชียตะวันออกเฉียงใต้และเอเชียเริ่มก่อตัวขึ้นจากการวางนโยบายเศรษฐกิจของสิงคโปร์และจีนที่รัฐบาลเป็นผู้นำนโยบายเศรษฐกิจและลดความสำคัญของประชาธิปไตยลง และให้ความสำคัญกับการเมืองในฐานะเป็นแรงผลักดันหลักให้รัฐดำเนินนโยบายเศรษฐกิจแบบรัฐพัฒนาการอำนาจนิยมใหม่ได้มีประสิทธิภาพมากขึ้น อีกทั้งจีนยังเป็นตัวอย่างประเทศที่มีพัฒนาการทางเศรษฐกิจอย่างต่อเนื่องทั้ง ๆ ที่ไม่ใช่ประเทศเสรีนิยมประชาธิปไตย บทความนี้จึงเป็นการคลี่แนวคิดรัฐพัฒนาการและอำนาจนิยมใหม่ให้ผู้อ่านได้เห็นความสัมพันธ์ของสองแนวคิดนี้มากขึ้น

คำสำคัญ: รัฐพัฒนาการ/ อำนาจนิยมใหม่/ ประชาธิปไตย/ การพัฒนา

As many countries have become neo-authoritarian developmental states while not necessarily being authoritarian, the questions of how the states use development and economic growth as excuses to intervene the market or to practice authoritarian ways of governing the countries have arisen. Therefore, this article aims to portray literatures on developmental state and neo-authoritarian developmental state, and democracy to clarify if there are missing links between these theories that allow the state to be undemocratic for the economy's sake.

DEVELOPMENTAL STATE AND NEO-AUTHORITARIAN DEVELOPMENTAL STATE

Chalmers Johnson introduced the term “developmental state” to explain Japanese state roles in late 1980 to early 1990 where Japan, and also other East Asian countries, rapidly enhanced their economies. These countries have been models for economic development for other developing countries. Although they had been widely criticized that 1997 Asian economic crisis was a result of the models, and the crisis was a proof of victory of the Western capitalism (Nithi Nuangjamnong, 2009, p.73).

In many cases, developmental state policies are implemented hand in hand with nationalism policies because the model of developmental state in East Asian countries is created to respond Western-dominated globalization. Though the model has been criticized for corruptions and inefficiency, developmental state policies are justified by the state's needs to sharpen economic competitiveness and nationalism (Woo-Cummings, 1999, p.1). As well, nationalist policies are crucial for creating cultural homogeneity, especially for not-yet consolidated democratic countries. That is, the government would implement nationalizing state policies that aim to increase cultural homogeneity by sending message that the state is “of and for” the nation. In addition, the government could also control over means of socialization—

such as media censorship—and incorporate dominant religion and culture into state symbols, such as national anthem and eligibility for military services. The mentioned is a subjective idea of the nation. Therefore, if the state identifies itself with this idea, the conflicts between different policies that it intends to implement would be reduced as the citizens would identify themselves with the nation. (Inoguchi, Newman, and Keane, 1998. pp.58-59).

South Korea, another developmental state, improved its economy by “getting the prices wrong” which is opposite to Neo-classical economic practice of “getting the prices right.” To elaborate, South Korean state makes decision on what and how much the business sector should produce and provides subsidies on targeted industries when needed (Amsden, 1989, pp.143-144)

Apart from Japan and South Korea being called a developmental state, Taiwan is labelled as a neo-developmental state where the state selects targeted industries and plans economic development strategies through several measures, such as direct and/or indirect support to private sectors, knowledge transfer, and import-substitution industrialization (ISI) (Amsden and Chu, 2003, pp.168-169).

Looking at the examples of South Korea, Taiwan and Japan, developmental state does not require the state to be authoritarian in order to be qualified as a developmental state. On the other hand, there are many cases of authoritarian countries that failed miserably in developing their economies, such as authoritarian Latin American states under bureaucratic authoritarianism. Therefore, though authoritarianism can facilitate effective intervention in economic and development policies, it does not guarantee economic success (Woo-Cumings, 1999, p.52).

Additionally, in globalization era, though it is more difficult for a state to intervene economic policies—because the state must endure international political economic rules of embedded neoliberalism that supports free

market, privatization of public enterprises and monetary reform—a neo-developmental state could also adapt itself to cope with democracy and democratic institutional structures and agents that attached to the regime. Hence, that does not mean that the state roles in managing its economy has weaken or ended in globalization era, rather the state has adapted itself to cope with globalization. (Cerny, 2008, p.2)

Southeast Asian’s developmental state model was created during Lee Kuan Yew’s premiership from 1959-1990. His opponents were sent to jails and Singaporeans were treated like children. Lee created Singaporean state with components of a modern state, then added the Asian values to it. The Asian alternative of Singapore’s model is different from the Western state where “the government should be democratic and generous” because, to the Singaporean model, “the government is elitist and stingy” (Micklethwait and Wooldridge, 2014, pp.133-137). The model was drawn from Lee’s assumptions that Western democracy was no longer efficient; both capitalism and society need to be directed; and getting the government right is the key to the regime’s survival and success (Micklethwait and Wooldridge, 2014. p.145).

While Singapore provides an Asian alternative with elitist and stingy government model, China is a more brutal version. Chinese state directs both public and private sectors, especially state-owned companies that dominate strategic industries. More importantly, China’s state capital has gone global as its companies have been reaching out abroad. For example, there are several Chinese companies pursuing oil, timber, diamonds, copper and iron ore in Africa while other Chinese businessmen are building infrastructures to facilitate the upcoming transactions at site. Therefore, to China, state capitalism has become its main foreign activity (Micklethwait and Wooldridge, 2014, pp.146-153).

Apart from looking at organizations that lead state development, Adrain Leftwich proposes that we can also look at “the primacy of politics in

development” where politics is the central, dominant variable in shaping the country’s development. Whether development is being perceived as exploitation of natural resources, planned promotion of economic, social and political advancement, conditions, processes, economic growth, structural change, or modernization, dominant political actors and politics per se is the main prevailing variable of that development (Leftwich, 2000, pp.4-39).

To compare different perspectives on developmental state theories is applicable by looking at their units of analysis. For instance, Charlmers Johnson use organization—or MITI where the cream of Japanese bureaucrats work for—as his unit of analysis, while Leftwich argue that politics is the most appropriate unit of analysis, especially when state development is being centralized at the high level of politics.

DEMOCRACY THEORY

Democracy and Democratization

Thomas Carothers stated that a transition paradigm—from authoritarian to democracy—is defined as five core assumptions: First, and most important assumption, is “moving away from dictatorial rule”; second, democracy should come in three stages—opening the country to democratic system; breaking through old collapsing dictatorial regime; and democratic consolidation after the transition; third, believing that democracy requires elections; fourth, “economic level, political history, institutional legacies, ethnic make-up, sociocultural traditions, or other structural features” of a country are not major factors that the country would be able to be democratic because there are cases that countries with unlikely features were able to transit to democracy, such as Mongolia, Albania, or Mauritania; and fifth, state building and democracy must go hand in hand (Carothers, 2002).

Moreover, democratization has three presumptions: linear; zigzag; and no-end, where linear democratization, such as modernization theory, states

an assumption that every country, sooner or later, must enter democracy and “Liberalised authoritarianism is not a stable equilibrium; the halfway house does not stand” (Huntington, 1991, pp.174-175). Zigzag democratization portrays integration between trust networks (e.g. kinship, religious membership) and public politics; insulation of major categorical inequalities (e.g. gender, ethnicity, religion, class) from public politics; and autonomy of major power centers (esp. those with coercive means) in public politics (Tilly, 2007).

The last assumption about democratization is “no-end democratization” where democracy may not be an inevitable end of political development. That is, hybrid regime theorists believe that most developing countries have a combination between democracy and authoritarianism as their political system. At the same time, authoritarian countries can also evolve without entering democracy.

To Guillermo A. O'Donnell, there are 3 different, but intertwined, concepts embodied in modern democracy values: Democracy; Republicanism; and Liberalism. That is, democracy, in this sense, means majoritarianism which is majority rule referring its authority from the voice of majority, while republicanism focuses on public interests and liberalism focuses on individual interests, especially rights and freedom. These 3 concepts must go hand in hand. Otherwise, democracy without republicanism would lead to majority tyranny; liberalism without republicanism and democracy would lead to plutocracy; and republicanism without liberalism and democracy would lead to paternalistic rule of a self-righteous elite (O'Donnell, 1998).

Liberal Democracy

Asian Democracy Index (ADI) uses liberalization as one of two dimensions of monopoly disintegration where: 1) liberalization which highlights civil rights; and 2) democratization emphasizing vertical accountability. It also suggests two ideas of liberalization and equalization as core principles of

democracy. To be precise, “liberalization is a process to restore the autonomy of each field of a society by de-integrating the monopoly-complex, and to realize self-legislation” while equalization is explained as “the transformation in the relations of power in each field of politic, economy, and civil society.”

ADI does not only divide liberalization into two sub-categories: autonomy and ability of competition/accountability but also dividing equalization into two sub-categories: pluralization and solidary/consequential equality. As well, it argues that the degree of equalization explains how well a certain country has developed its democracy’s quality.

Liberal democracy has three dispositions are 1) Anarchist; 2) Realist; and 3) Minimalist. These are political responses to conflict, according to Benjamin Barber, can be put as “conflict-denying;” “conflict-repressing;” and “conflict-tolerating” respectively. That is, anarchist approach tends to do nothing about the conflict, while realist approach crushes it, and minimalist approach lives with it. As well, he gives an example of American liberal democracy where it denies conflicts in its free-market economy and egalitarianism assumptions, while repressing and adjusting conflicts about power struggle between the state and individuals and groups, and tolerating conflicts with its liberal temper. (Barber, 2003, pp. 5-7)

Liberalism, as Hoffman and Graham portray in *Introduction to Political Theory*, has three distinct spheres. 1) Justification that there must have liberal political institutions, which a state can be an example of this justification, and state authorities shall be considered justified as they are rational actors who calculate people’s interests to be put into the institutions. 2) Constitution and policy where the constitution determines law making procedures, and the policy contents shall indicate divisions of power and basic rights of individuals. 3) Attitudes of the people plays important role in sustaining and protecting liberal institutions, only if they see possibilities in endorsing liberal values in the institutions. (Hoffman and Graham, 2006, pp.164-165)

Hoffman and Graham also categorize liberalism into four subfields: liberalism as toleration; contractarianism; right-based liberalism; and utilitarianism. To elaborate, liberalism emerged from struggle for religious toleration during the Reformation movements criticizing roles of the Church and how humans reach salvation; and Wars of Religion during 16th-17th centuries, while, in 18th-19th centuries, toleration moves to more secular arguments debating about enlightenment. (Hoffman and Graham, 2006, pp.165-170)

The second sub-category is contractarianism, led by Thomas Hobbes proposing that for humans to give up their power to the sovereign through the social contract, although that does not seem to be liberal, but it provides liberal reflection of the state—to protect its subjects from internal and external threats. As well, Hobbes' arguments shall be considered as liberal as he rejects natural authority which draws its power from divined rights, rather proposing a sovereign who draws his power from the social contract. Explaining that, in the state of nature, people are equal, Hobbes gives an example that all men have equal chance to survive as the strongest man can also be killed by the weakest man because there is no law, so there is no justice and injustice. (Hoffman and Graham, 2006, pp.170-175)

The third sub-category is right-based liberalism, led by John Locke and Immanuel Kant. For Locke, Hoffmann and Graham put him in this sub-category as he explains that—in the state of nature—though there is no sovereign, no one has the right to suppress others and humans have natural duty to preserve themselves. Unlike Hobbes, Locke believes people have a right to rebel against the state, and—through the social contract—their individual rights must be protected by the state. (Hoffman and Graham, 2006, pp.175-177).

At the beginning of this section, liberalism theory is explained to be contrasted to “illiberalism theory” which is also clarified here. Illiberalism is

not opposite to liberalism per se as it is usually referred to political regimes that have democratically elected government where executives often exceed their power limits and deprive citizens' basic rights. (Zakaria, 1997) Therefore, in illiberalism regimes, such as in Singapore, Peru and Philippines, there is frequent election—but it might not be free and fair—and other democratic institutions and mechanisms installed in the regimes. The regimes can be considered as democracy, though it is not liberal democracy.

Apart from liberalism and illiberalism, another fruitful theory that is presented in this section is “democracy theory” accompanied with its sub categories: managed/guided democracy; thin and strong democracy; theories relevant to democratization and modernization theories. For managed democracy, the concept was first mentioned in Walter Lippmann's “Public Opinion” that representative government and democratic values are managed by certain groups of people, the elites, using their self-centric opinion which puts democracy hanging on men's dignity. (Lippmann, 1922, pp.195-197)

Not only Lippmann, but also Sheldon Wolin gives insights on managed democracy. According to his “Democracy Inc.,” managed democracy is centered on containing electoral politics and it operates “through certain developments, notably in the economy, that promoted integration, rationalization, concentrated wealth, and a faith that virtually any problem—from health care to political crises, even faith itself—could be managed, that is, subjected to control, predictability, and cost-effectiveness in the delivery of the product.” By that sense, voters' preferences and behaviors shall be predicted as that of consumers in capitalism. (Wolin, 2008, p.47)

What's more, Benjamin Barber points in “Strong Democracy” that liberal democracy is a thin form of democracy because it bases on human nature and interests which are individualistic—and would limit democracy to individualistic, private and provisional—and are not intrinsically democratic. (Barber, 2003, pp.3-4)

Barber quotes Winston Churchill “(Democracy is) the worst form of government in the world, except for all the other forms,” in order to point that liberal democracy is a system that promotes individuals’ liberty rather than securing public justice; focuses more on advancing interests than delivering goods; keeps men apart rather than bringing them together. Consequently, liberal democracy protects individuals’ privacy, properties, interests and rights, rather than fighting back harms to community, justice, citizenship or participation. (Barber, 2003, p.4)

Watson and Barber explain in “the Struggle for Democracy” that three main challenges for democracy are 1) Fall of Communism—a sudden disappearance of democracy’s prominent enemy that made democratic regime the only option for all countries. (Watson and Barber, 1988, pp.191-193) 2) Technology—while new technologies can be seen as one of challenges for democracy as they facilitate polarization; make searching for common ground more difficult—divide; isolate; and atomize people; or can be used as manipulative tools by the elites, the real challenge is politics. That is, to have free and fair access to technology through setting up of technology policies can help establish free communication for citizens. Democracy requires time and patience. (Watson and Barber, 1988, pp.193-196) 3) Globalization of Markets which has eroded significance of national sovereignty and changed relationships between politics and economics. (Watson and Barber, 1988, pp.197-203)

In addition to theories mentioned above, Seymour Martin Lipset argues that humans have debated about relations between wealth and participation that citizens can wisely participate in politics only in wealthy societies by explaining that links between economic development and democracy stability are more obvious. The more a particular country developed, the more it is capable of sustaining democratic regime. (Lipset. 1959. pp. 75) He also explains about “economic condition” that middleclass

enhancement helps reduce radical conflicts in a society and sustain democratic values as the class, as an organization, provides participation channels to people. However, this argument proves to be wrong in the Thai society. Looking at the case of recent PDRC and other middleclass movements to overthrow democratically-elected government and to beg for military coup.

However, Samuel P. Huntington argues that modernization does not automatically lead to political development, rather political decay because economic development leads to mass social mobilization—and if social mobilization is faster than economic development, social frustration is to be expected. Therefore, promoting people participation can help reduce the tension that could lead to political instability and political decay if not well responded. (Huntington, 1968)

Almond and Verba, in addition, argue in “The Civic Culture” that, for developing countries, to apply participatory democracy is not only to establish democratic institutions, but also to grow political culture that responds to the institutions. To them, the most desirable political culture is a mix between parochial, subject and participant, which means that, in this culture, people are politically active but are not to intervene with government’s administration; and moderately committed to ideologies and negotiable. (Almond and Verba, 1989)

Delegative Democracy

Delegative democracy is a part of Defective Democracy, which people transfer their power to political leaders as their representatives. That gives the representatives absolute authority, making check and balance challenging, which is a case in many countries. As well, if the people are not well-informed, check and balance will be even more difficult, if not impossible. There will be a tendency that representatives, especially executives, will not accept scrutiny from independent entities, or seeking to reduce juridical power. All in all, Delegative democracy is contradict to modern democracy—rule of law and

liberalism—in which check and balance process is its main value (O’Donnell, 1994).

Apart from a functioning state, Linz and Stepan suggested that conditions to democratic consolidation were: free and lively civil society; relatively autonomous political society; state apparatus must be subjected to rule of law; state bureaucracy must be able to respond to democratic government; and institutionalized economic society (Linz & Stepan, 1996). As well, Larry Diamond pointed that for a country to consolidate its democracy, it, first, must have legitimation—people’s consent and acceptance that the government is legal and rightful. That is, the people must believe that democracy is “the only game in town” where they trust that all political problems and policy processes must be done accordingly to democratic norms, processes and rules. Second, its political culture must be harmonious to democratic values, for example, nonviolent norms, compromise and negotiation. Third, political institutions—namely, elections, political parties, parliament, judiciary, and executive—must be institutionalized so that they could effectively function and receive people’s acceptance. Fourth, economy must perform in a way that income is fairly distributed, and the economic system must be constantly and sustainably developed that poverty is being relived and social safety net is being created in communities. Fifth, political effectiveness must ensure that social and political problems—such as crimes, political participation and corruption—are solved with effectiveness and, at the same time, accordingly to fairness, rights and freedom of individuals (Diamond, 1999, pp.64-116).

Moreover, rule of law requires 3 components: rights, accountability, and equality. Democracy uses rule of law to create rules and regulations; political rights and equality, which are related to quality of democracy. The difference between rule of law and “rule by law” is that rule by law does not guarantee individual rights and freedom, and does not require accountability,

while rule of law does. However, rule of law's implementation is still problematic as law suppressing certain groups of population, such as gays, lesbians, women and disabled persons are still being enforced; and that certain rules and regulations may not be equally enforced. Rule of law encourages accountability—categorized into 3 different aspects: 1. vertical accountability, exercised in elections; 2. societal accountability, practiced through civil society and its effectiveness depends on levels of civil society's development in certain countries; and 3. Horizontal accountability, implemented through parliament and independent entities which found difficult to practice in developing countries. (O'Donnell, 2004)

In “Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies,” O'Donnell argued that vertical accountability which is check and balance within political entities might not be effective, if not impossible, due to cronyism. Therefore, horizontal accountability has come to fill the gap by having independent entities scrutinizing the state. As well, accountability is practiced through law and regulations, and it has two aspects: judicial activism—judiciary examining the state, especially the executive; and judicial restraint—people scrutinizing the executive through democracy (O'Donnell, 1998).

Apart from that, societal accountability has risen from assumptions that vertical accountability could not effectively function. That is because, first, vertical accountability simply requires elections—which hardly affects both people and representatives; second, people individually vote without thoroughly exchanging opinion and deliberating; third, people are not well-informed. Correspondingly, societal accountability functions through civil society by exposing facts to set agenda in the society; and pressuring independent entities to perform horizontal accountability on certain problems (Peruzzotti and Smulovitz, 2008).

Talking about elections, Andreas Schedler explained that authoritarianism is not different from electoral authoritarianism because it is merely to add

election into authoritarian regime and authoritarian rulers must seek control over parliament; judiciary; electoral mechanism; media; civil society; and local government. The controlling strategies are: disempowerment those organizations to the point that they would be powerless, dysfunctional or fully manipulated; agent control through parties or other mechanisms; fragmentation is used to disintegrate organizations that are not under control; insulation; reducing electoral competitiveness; media censorship and control; reducing civil society's role by sabotaging NGOs, disintegrating and giving certain NGOs power; controlling local government by denouncing local authorities and securing old controlling power (Schedler, 2010).

In “Political Order in Changing Society,” Fukuyama clarified that modern liberal democracy must acquire three components: first, state must be subjected to rule of law; second, rule of law must limit state's power; and third, mechanism of accountability forces rulers to be scrutinized by, at least, elections. These three components must equally function and work hand in hand.

While modern democracy has still been problematic, populism has added more dimensions into it. In other words, populism responds to voters' needs, which is, to some extent, similar to majoritarianism as populism focuses on responding the mass in order to create equality. Designed to please the mass, populism itself is contrast to elitism, and majoritarianism could lead to populism—that could be contradict to another core value of democracy, liberalism, and eventually lead to social divide (Plattner, 2010).

Dankwart Rustow introduced “dynamic model” to explain factors that lead to democracy. He recognizes that political changes are not straight forward changes, but his dynamic model points that to be democratized. A country needs to have “national unity” as a background condition, followed by 3 stages of democratization as 1) preparatory phase; 2) decision phase; and 3) habituation phase. That is, preparatory phase happens when

non-democratic regime collapses, followed by decision phase where new political order establishment takes place, and consolidation phase grows by developing democratic institutions and integration of democratic values into political culture and civil society. He also suggested that for the newly established democracy to last, at the habituation phase, 3 processes must function. First, citizens and politicians must have faith in the new rules—elections that would let politicians take turn as government and opposition accordingly to citizens' votes. Second, democratic mechanism and competitive recruitment must work well enough to confirm politicians' democratic beliefs and practices. Last, the mass nationwide would link to politicians by democratic mechanism, elections (Rustow, 2009).

Seymour Martin Lipset describes that economic development is an important factor ensuring democratic regime as economic development is comprised of wealth, industrialization, urbanization and level of education. In his study, he found that economic development creates factors that safeguard democracy as well as builds civic culture and civil society because of following reasons. First, economic development offers democratic attitudes—moderation and toleration. Second, higher level of economic development guarantees higher level of education, lowers poor population, as well as, its extreme political attitudes and policies. Third, growing wealth and political stability gives wealthy classes—elites and middleclass—generous attitudes towards poor class. Additionally, wealth gives ruling class political resources which eventually softens zero-sum styled political struggle and promotes compromise and clientelistic ties. Fourth, economic prosperity makes room for acceptance in loyal opposition and traditions. Fifth, Industrialization and urbanization support mass organization which is social basis of democratic regime (Lipset, 1959).

Samuel P. Huntington saw democratization, especially during 1974-1990, as global democratic revolution throughout 30 countries. It was

“the third wave” of democratization that was risen from: 1) legitimacy problems of authoritarianism, while the globe was embracing democratic values, led to economic and military failures. 2) A big leap in global economic growth lifted living standard and education quality as well as number of middleclass around the world. 3) Shift in principles and activities of Roman-Catholic church during 1963-1965 that led to battle authoritarianism. 4) External actors’ policy shift toward democracy, especially European Union, the United States and USSR. 5) Snowball effect, or the effect of the third wave of democratization, stimulated democratization throughout the globe, making democracy an ideal type (Huntington, 1991, pp.45-46).

Apart from that, Huntington proposed democratization theory that is divided into 4 stages. 1) Decay of authoritarian rule; 2) Transition to democracy—highlighted by high political instability with high risks to democratic breakdown and power sharing between authoritarian and democratic fractions through struggle and compromise. 3) Democratic consolidation—taking place through elite consensus that shapes the country’s democratic rules and institutions. 4) Maturing of democratic political order or matured democracy.

Geoffrey Pridham expressed that the study of democratization and democratic consolidation began in the past two decades, especially during 1990s. He suggested that because economic systems, politics and national building in different countries are diverse, democratization of certain countries must be presented through historical aspect and these factors must be integrated in the analysis. Democratization can be categorized into 2 patterns: formal or procedural democracy; and substantive democracy. That is, formal or procedural democracy emphasizes on rules, procedures, and institutions. Its goal is to give decision-making power to voters through competitive elections. The concept is influenced by Robert A. Dahl’s polyarchy where not

only political competition and participation, but also freedom and pluralism are underlined.

Moreover, Mary Kaldor and Ivan Vejvoda proposed “formal democracy” which is comprised of 1) civil integration, 2) rule of law, 3) separation of power, 4) elected authorities, 5) free and fair election, 6) freedom of expression and press freedom, 7) freedom of association, and 8) civilian control over military.

Substantive democracy indicates control over power of relations that increases individuals’ chances in influencing debates and decisions that have effects on the societies. To elaborate that, this kind of democracy covers formal democracy as the formal democracy is crucial, but insufficient. That is because, democratic regime cannot be reduced to formal or institutional characteristics. Therefore, substantive democracy is stronger, at the same time, giving deeper political dimension that covers roles of political parties and their significance in political participation; roles of media and its representativeness in portraying political debates; local governments’ responsiveness on local issues; and, at least, strong civil society’s existence which includes independent entities that function on inspecting governments’ misuse of authority.

Pridham also defined democratization as whole process relevant to transition from authoritarianism, or absolutism, to liberal democracy. The process has 2 patterns: multi-stage transition, and multidimensional transition. First, multi-stage transition includes liberalization, or authoritarian breakdown, democratization and democratic consolidation. This transition will be completed once democracy is consolidated. As well, the transition might not be linear because there could be interventions, delaying or halting the processes, especially at the early stage of the transition. Second, multidimensional transition contains various dimensions of liberal democracy where new rules and regulations; social functions and linkage; interactions

between classes—particularly elites and mass; and other dimensions relevant to democratization, such as foreign dimensions, or events that might affect decision making.

At the same time, Pridham defined liberalization as “qualitative change in authoritarian rules, such as lifting restrictions on individuals and groups’ freedom. Liberalization is different from democratization on the basis that liberalization requires changes in structure of political authority, as well as creating liberalizing effects on a bigger and more open scale. Consequently, liberalization could stimulate democratic transition, but it is not necessarily a prerequisite factor of democratization. To conclude, democratization could happen without liberalization, but liberalization must be followed by democratization (Pridham, 2000, pp.18-19).

To Pridham, democratic transition is the first stage of regime change, starting with authoritarian breakdown which is followed by a new constitution drafting, new administration under a new political structure, and negotiation along the processes of constitution drafting and political competition rules and regulations drafting, taking authoritarian agencies and abolishing laws irrelevant to democratic ways of life (Pridham, 2000, p.19).

Besides, democratic consolidation, which is a longer process than democratic transition, affects more deeply on mass attitudes and requires legitimation of the new regime. Pridham positioned consolidation into 2 categories: positive consolidation and negative consolidation. Negative consolidation is a remark that a country has achieve a significant or partial degree of consolidation, such as reduce in challenges to democratization, as well as making individuals or groups that are oppose to democratization insignificant. Therefore, negative consolidation concerns about elites and their behaviors during democratization. On the other hand, positive consolidation involves circulation democratic values among both elites and mass, and,

therefore, is a longer process requiring remarks in political culture shift toward democracy (Pridham, 2000, p.20).

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